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We show how continuous variable systems can allow the direct communication of messages with
an acceptable degree of privacy. This is possible by combining a suitable phase-space encoding of the
plain message with real-time checks of the quantum communication channel. The resulting protocol
works properly when a small amount of noise affects the quantum channel. If this noise is non-
tolerable, the protocol stops leaving a limited amount of information to a potential eavesdropper.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.–p
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, quantum communication protocols
have been extended to the domain of continuous variable
(CV) systems, i.e., quantum systems, like the bosonic
modes of the radiation field, which are characterized by
infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces [1]. In particular, it
has been understood how a sender (Alice) can exploit
bosonic modes in order to send analog signals to a re-
ceiver (Bob) and then extract a secret binary key from
these signals [2, 3]. Beyond the possibility of such a
continuous variable quantum key distribution (QKD),
here we show how to use these systems in order to per-
form a (quasi)confidential quantum direct communica-
tion (QDC) [4], i.e., the (quasi)private communication of
a message from Alice to Bob which is directly encoded in
CV systems.
The ideal situation for QDC trivially occurs when Alice
and Bob are connected by a noiseless channel. However,
in general, this is not the case and the honest users must
randomly switch their confidential communication with
real-time checks on the channel. As soon as they detect
the presence of a non-tolerable noise, they promptly stop
the communication. The maximum noise that can be tol-
erated is connected to the maximum amount of informa-
tion that they are willing to give up to an eavesdropper.
In other words, a good QDC protocol should enable Alice
and Bob to communicate all the message when the noise
is suitably low, while losing a small amount of informa-
tion when it is not.
Let us consider a bosonic mode described by quadra-
ture operators qˆ and pˆ, satisfying [qˆ, pˆ] = i. An ar-
bitrary state of the system (density operator ρ) must
fulfill the uncertainty principle V (qˆ)V (pˆ) ≥ 1/4, where
V (xˆ) = Tr(ρxˆ2)− [Tr(ρxˆ)]2 denotes the variance of the
arbitrary quadrature xˆ = qˆ or pˆ. In particular, coherent
states satisfy V (qˆ) = V (pˆ) := ∆, where ∆ = 1/2 repre-
sents the quantum shot-noise. This is the fundamental
noise that affects disjoint measurements of the quadra-
tures qˆ and pˆ (homodyne detection), and it is doubled
to ∆ = 1 when the two quadratures are jointly mea-
sured (heterodyne detection). A density operator ρ may
be faithfully represented by the Wigner quasi-probability
distribution W (q, p), whose continuous variables q and p
are the eigenvalues of the quadratures. In this phase-
space representation, states with Gaussian Wigner func-
tions are called Gaussian states. This is the case of a
coherent state |α¯〉, whose Gaussian Wigner function is
centered at α¯ = 2−1/2(q¯ + ip¯). For coherent states the
detection of an arbitrary quadrature xˆ provides outcomes
x following the marginal distribution
G∆(x − x¯) = 1√
2pi∆
exp
[
− (x− x¯)
2
2∆
]
, (1)
where ∆ = 1/2 for homodyne and ∆ = 1 for heterodyne.
THE PROTOCOL
Let us show how Alice can transmit message bits by
using the phase-space of a bosonic mode. We discretize
the phase-space via a square lattice of half-step size Ω.
Then, an arbitrary cell specifies the values of two bits
(u, u′) which are given by the parity of its address along
the q and p axes (see Fig. 1). In a simple lattice en-
coding, Alice embeds two bits (u, u′) by randomly choos-
ing a target cell with parities (u, u′) or, equivalently, by
constructing the message amplitude αuu′ pointing at the
center of that target cell. Then, in a first naive protocol,
Alice directly prepares the coherent state |αuu′ 〉 from the
message amplitude αuu′ . Such a state is sent to Bob,
who performs a heterodyne detection for extracting αuu′
and, therefore, the pair (u, u′). Notice that, even in the
presence of a noiseless channel, Bob’s decoding cannot
be perfect since the Gaussian shape of the coherent state
spreads over the whole phase space and this leads to an
intrinsic error. It is easy to check that the probability of
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FIG. 1: Square lattice in phase-space with unit cell of size
2Ω. Each cell specifies the values of a pair of bits (u, u′).
an intrinsic error (per transmitted bit) is
ε(Ω,∆) = 2
∞∑
j=0
∫ (4j+3)Ω
(4j+1)Ω
dx G∆(x) . (2)
In particular, here we fix Ω ≃ 2.57 in order to have the
reasonable low value of ε = 1%. On the one hand, such
a choice for Ω enables Bob to approach an error-free de-
coding when the communication channel is noiseless. On
the other hand, it makes the protocol fragile to eaves-
dropping since Eve can optimize her attack to the struc-
ture of the lattice, e.g., by using non-universal quantum
cloning machines.
Fortunately, we can preclude these strategies by adding
a simple classical (masking) step to the above procedure.
In fact, after having computed the message amplitude
αuu′ , Alice can add a mask amplitude αM , in such a
way that the total signal amplitude α¯ := αM + αuu′ is
continuously distributed in phase space according to a
spread Gaussian (see Fig. 1). Then, in a second refined
protocol, Alice prepares the message αuu′ , the mask αM
and the signal state |α¯〉 (see Fig. 2). As a first step, Al-
ice sends the signal state |α¯〉 to Bob, who heterodynes it
with outcome β ≃ α¯. Then, after Bob’s confirmation
of detection, Alice classically communicates the mask
αM . As a consequence of these steps, Bob gets the pair
(β, αM ) from his detection and Alice’s communication.
Then, Bob is able to unmask the signal by computing
β − αM ≃ α¯ − αM = αuu′ and, therefore, retrieves the
message bits (u, u′) via lattice decoding. The key-point
here is that Eve must choose the probing interaction be-
fore knowing the value of the mask. Since the continuous
signal α¯ is highly modulated, the best choice is to adopt
a universal interaction which does not privilege any par-
ticular portion of the phase-space. Here, we consider for
Eve the usage of a universal Gaussian quantum cloning
machine (UGQCM) [5]. Such a machine maps the sig-
nal state |α¯〉 into a pair of output clones ρB (sent to
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FIG. 2: Message mode (MM). From the message bits
(u, u′), Alice computes the message amplitude αuu′ (lattice
encoding) and then adds the mask αM achieving the signal
amplitude α¯. Then, Alice prepares and sends to Bob the
signal state |α¯〉, that Bob heterodynes with outcome β (step
1 in the picture). After detection, Bob classically informs
Alice (step 2) and, then, Alice classically communicates the
mask αM (step 3). At that point, Bob is able to unmask
the signal (β − αM ), thus reconstructing αuu′ and, therefore,
(u, u′).
Bob) and ρE (taken by Eve), equal to a Gaussian mod-
ulation of |α¯〉 〈α¯| with cloning variances σ2B := σ2 and
σ2E = (4σ
2)−1. This means that the arbitrary quadra-
ture xˆ of the clone K = B,E has a marginal distribution
equal to GK
∆+σ2
K
(x− x¯).
α−
α−
α−
BobAlice
σ2
β =-
Test
α−
σ2= 0 ?
τ
α−
1
1 3
2
3
1
“click”
FIG. 3: Control mode (CM). Alice picks up a Gaussian
amplitude α¯ and prepares a signal coherent state |α¯〉. Such a
state is sent to Bob, who heterodynes it with outcome β (step
1 in the picture). Then, Bob classically informs Alice (step
2) and Alice communicates the value of the signal α¯ (step 3).
At that point, Bob computes the test variable τ := β− α¯ and
tests the noise of the channel.
The above procedure of directly communicating mes-
sage bits is called the message mode (MM) of the proto-
col. However, Alice and Bob have to also perform real-
time controls of the added noise σ2 on the channel. This
is possible if Alice randomly switches from message mode
instances to suitable instances of control mode (CM) [6].
In control mode (see Fig. 3), Alice does not process any
3text message but only prepares and sends the signal state
|α¯〉. Then, after Bob’s detection (outcome β), Alice com-
municates the value α¯ of the signal amplitude. At that
point, Bob extracts from (β, α¯) the actual value of the
test variable τ := β − α¯ which is then used to infer the
total noise ∆B = 1 + σ
2 affecting the signal. As soon
as they recognize a non-tolerable noise, i.e., σ2 > σ˜2 for
some threshold noise σ˜2, they stop the communication.
Hereafter, we assume a zero-tolerance protocol where no
added noise is tolerated on the channel, i.e., σ˜2 = 0. We
shall see that the QDC protocol can be applied in realistic
situations even with such a strict condition [7].
Let us show how the real-time check works in detail.
For each control mode, Bob collects the two quadra-
tures x = q, p of the test variable τ . Then, after M
control modes, he has collected 2M quadratures val-
ues {x1, x2, · · · , x2M−1, x2M} which give the estimator
v =
∑2M
l=1 x
2
l . By using this estimator, Bob must distin-
guish the two hypotheses
H0 = no Eve⇔ σ2 = 0 , H1 = yes Eve⇔ σ2 6= 0 . (3)
Let us fix the confidence level r (i.e., the probability to
reject H0 though true) to a reasonably low value (e.g.,
r = 5 × 10−7). Then, the hypothesis H0 is accepted if
and only if
v < V2M,1−r , (4)
where Vi,j is the jth quantile of the χ2 distribution with
i degrees of freedom. In other words, Alice and Bob
continue their direct communication in MM as long as
the condition of Eq. (4) is satisfied in CM.
Let us explicitly analyze what happens when the
channel is subject to eavesdropping. In an individual
UGQCM attack, Eve clones the signal input and, then,
heterodynes her output to estimate the signal amplitude
α¯. After the release of the mask’s value αM , Eve infers
the message amplitude αuu′ and, therefore, the input bits
(u, u′). In this process, Eve introduces an added noise σ2
on the Alice-Bob channel, while her output is affected
by a total noise equal to ∆E = 1 + (4σ
2)−1. On the one
hand, we must compute the probability ΠM (σ
2) that Eve
evades M control modes while introducing noise σ2 6= 0.
After some algebra we get
ΠM (σ
2) =
[
Γ(M, 0)− Γ
(
M,
V2M,1−r
2(1 + σ2)
)]/
(M − 1)! ,
(5)
where Γ(z, a) :=
∫ +∞
a dt t
z−1e−t is the incomplete
gamma function. On the other hand, we must evaluate
the amount of information she can steal during her unde-
tected life on the channel. Let us assume that every input
bit is a bit of information. As a consequence, the stolen
information per MM is equal to IAE = 2[1−H(p)], where
H(p) := −p log p−(1−p) log(1−p) and p = ε(Ω,∆E) can
be computed from Eq. (2). By combining ΠM and IAE ,
we can derive Eve’s survival probability as a function of
the stolen information. Let c be the probability of a con-
trol mode, so that N runs of the protocol are composed
by cN control modes and (1 − c)N message modes, on
average. As a consequence, the survival probability will
be P := ΠcN (σ
2) and the average number of stolen bits
will be I := (1 − c)NIAE(σ2). Then, for every value of
c and σ2, we can determine the function P = P (I). Let
us fix c = 69/70 so that the protocol has efficiency
E := #bits
#systems
=
1
35
. (6)
In Fig. 4, we have numerically plotted P = P (I) for sev-
eral values of the added noise σ2. If the noise is low, e.g.,
σ2 = 0.01, Eve steals very little information (≃ 1 bit)
while Alice and Bob complete an almost noiseless QDC.
In particular, Alice is able to transmit ≃ 1.5×104 bits of
information by using N ≃ 5 × 105 systems. Notice that
the maximum length of the QDC is roughly bounded by
the verification of r−1 hypothesis tests and, therefore, it
is limited to about 4(1 − c)(cr)−1 bits (i.e., ≃ 1.2 × 105
bits or ≃ 4×106 systems using the above parameters). If
the attack is more noisy (e.g., σ2 = 1), Eve again steals
little information (≃ 1 bit). In such a case, in fact, Eve
is promptly detected by the honest parties who, how-
ever, are prevented from exchanging information (denial
of service). According to Fig. 4, Eve’s best strategy cor-
responds to use a UGQCM with σ2 ≃ 1/20, so that she
can steal ≃ 80 bits before being revealed (for a cut off of
P = 1%). In such a case, Alice transmits ≃ 630 bits by
using N ≃ 2.2× 104 systems.
How can we decrease the maximal amount of stolen
information? One possible solution is to increase fur-
ther the control mode probability c, so that the eventual
presence of Eve is detected before sending too many bits.
However, this approach affects the efficiency E . An alter-
native and better solution consists of making the decod-
ing more sensitive to the presence of added noise. Such
an approach is possible by introducing classical error cor-
recting codes.
IMPROVING QDC VIA REPETITION CODES
In the basic scheme of QDC with continuous variables,
noiseless communication is possible up to an intrinsic er-
ror probability ε depending on Ω. In particular, such
a probability decreases for increasing Ω. An alterna-
tive way for decreasing ε consists of leaving Ω unchanged
while introducing a classical error correcting code. Such
procedures are essentially equivalent for a noiseless chan-
nel, since ε is sufficiently small and the codes work very
well in that case. However, the scenario is different as
the channel becomes noisier. In such a case, in fact, the
correcting codes have a non-linear behavior which makes
their performance rapidly deteriorate. Such a non-linear
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FIG. 4: Survival probability P versus the number of stolen
bits I . In (a) no codes are used while in (b) a repetition code
with n = 35 is used. The curves refer to UGQCM attacks
with different values of added noise σ2.
effect can be exploited to critically split the correction ca-
pabilities, and therefore the information gains, between
the Alice-Bob channel and the Alice-Eve channel.
For the simplest case of an n-bit repetition code, an
input bit U = {0, 1} is encoded into a logical bit U¯ =
{0¯, 1¯} of n physical bits via the codewords
0¯ = 00 · · ·0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, 1¯ = 11 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. (7)
By choosing an odd n = 2m + 1 (with m = 1, 2, · · · ),
we can apply a non-ambiguous majority voting criterion.
This means that every bit-flip error of weight t < m+1 is
correctable, while every bit-flip error of weight t ≥ m+1
is not. Let us now consider a memoryless channel, where
each physical bit is perturbed independently with the
same bit-flip probability p (as happens in the case of in-
dividual attacks). Then, the probability of an uncor-
rectable error is given by
Pn(p) =
n∑
k=m+1
(
n
k
)
pk(1 − p)n−k . (8)
For a sufficiently large n, the curve Pn(p) displays a crit-
ical point after which the correction capability suddenly
starts to deteriorate very quickly (see, e.g., Fig. 5, show-
ing p˜ ≃ 0.3 for n = 35 and p˜ ≃ 0.4 for n = 103). Exactly
these critical points enable one to improve the QDC by
transforming the communication protocol into a thresh-
old process, where the sensitivity to added noise is re-
markably amplified.
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FIG. 5: Probability of an uncorrectable error Pn versus the
single bit-flip probability p. Here, we consider repetition codes
with n = 7; 15; 35; 103.
Let us choose a critical lattice’s half-step Ω˜, i.e., lead-
ing to a critical intrinsic error probability ε = p˜. On
the one hand, when the channel is noiseless, Bob is able
to recover the codewords and reconstruct the logical bit
with a very low error probability PB = Pn(p˜) (that we
call the logical intrinsic error probability). On the other
hand, when the channel is noisy, Alice’s information is
split into two sub-channels: the Alice-Bob channel, with
added noise σ2B = σ
2, and the Alice-Eve channel, with
added noise σ2E = (4σ
2)−1. The corresponding error
probabilities are respectively given by
PB = Pn(p˜+ pB) , PE = Pn(p˜+ pE) , (9)
where pB = pB(σ
2
B) and pE = pE(σ
2
E) are monotonic
functions of the added noises (and are therefore linked
by the uncertainty principle). Now, if Eve tries to hide
herself by perturbing the Alice-Bob channel with a rel-
atively small pB, then her dual pE will always be big
enough to perturb p˜ into the nonlinear region. As a con-
sequence, Eve will tend to experience PE ≃ 1/2, gaining
her negligible information.
Let us explicitly show how to use an n-bit repetition
code for encoding/decoding. This is possible by simply
adding pre-encoding and post-decoding classical steps to
the basic protocol. The message bits (U,U ′) are pre-
encoded into a pair of logical bits
U¯ = U1U2 · · ·Un , U¯ ′ = U ′1U ′2 · · ·U ′n , (10)
via the n-bit repetition code. Each pair of physical bits
(Uk, U
′
k) is then subject to the same encoding as before,
i.e., lattice encoding (Uk, U
′
k) → αuku′k := αk, masking
5αk → αk + αM = α¯ and quantum preparation α¯ → |α¯〉.
Then, after n message modes, Bob will have collected
perturbed versions of the n pairs (U1, U
′
1), · · · , (Un, U ′n).
By applying standard error recovery (majority voting),
he will then perform the post-decoding of (U,U ′). In
the same way as before, these instances of MM (each
one carrying a single physical bit of a codeword) must
be randomly switched with instances of CM, where Alice
skips encoding and simply sends Gaussian signals α¯ for
testing the channel (exactly as in Fig. 3)
Let us choose a repetition code with n = 35. Then,
consider a critical half-step Ω˜ = 1. Such a choice im-
plies p˜ ≃ 32% which leads to ε˜ ≃ 1% for the logical
bits (U,U ′). Then, let us also choose c = 1/2, so that we
again achieve an efficiency E = 1/35. Let us then analyze
the effect of a UGQCM attack. On every cloned system
(with noise σ2E), Eve detects the complex amplitude via
heterodyne detection, therefore, estimating Alice’s signal
amplitude α¯ up to a total noise ∆E = 1 + σ
2
E . After Al-
ice’s declaration of the mask αM , Eve derives the message
amplitude and, therefore, a pair of physical bits (Uk, U
′
k).
Each physical bit will be affected by an error probability
p(∆E). After n eavesdropped message modes, Eve will
be able to decode Alice’s logical bit by majority voting
up to an error probability PE = Pn[p(∆E)]. For each
logical bit, the acquired information is simply equal to
1 − H(PE). As a consequence, for each message mode,
Eve acquires on average
IAE(σ
2) = 2 [1−H(PE)] /n , (11)
bits of information (simply because 2 logical bits are sent
via n physical systems).
Let us then consider the probability of Eve to evadeM
control modes. Since the control mode is implemented
exactly as before, we have again ΠM (σ
2) as in Eq. (5).
Such a quantity can be again combined with the one of
Eq. (11). After N runs of the protocol, we have an aver-
age of cN control modes and (1−c)N message modes, so
that Eve’s survival probability is again ΠcN (σ
2) := P and
the stolen information is equal to (1− c)NIAE(σ2) := I.
Then, for every σ2, we can again evaluate the curve
P = P (I). According to Fig. (4), the best choice for
Eve is a UGQCM with σ2 ≃ 0.3, which enables her to
steal only 10 bits of information before being detected
(for P = 1%). Such a result is a strong improvement
with respect to the basic protocol, where 80 bits were
left to Eve. Notice that, for a low value of the noise
like σ2 = 0.1, Eve gets ≃ 1 bit while Alice transmits
≃ 320 bits of information by using N ≃ 1.1 × 104 sys-
tems. The maximal length of QDC is here bounded by
4(1− c)(ncr)−1 ≃ 3500 bits, i.e., N≃ 1.2× 105 quantum
systems.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have considered Alice and Bob confidentially com-
municating without resorting to QKD. Such a task is in
general risky and very demanding. However, here we
have shown how to construct a QDC protocol which uses
the same quantum resources as standard QKD, even if
they are exploited with a different logic. Such a proto-
col is sufficiently confidential since it combines real-time
checks of the channel and a suitable masking of the se-
cret information. In particular, the maximum stolen in-
formation (i.e., the lack of complete secrecy) can always
be decreased by increasing the number of controls at the
expense of efficiency. As an alternative approach we have
also suggested the use of error correcting codes, in such a
way as to amplify the difference of information between
the eavesdropper and the honest user.
As a natural consequence of a demanding task like
QDC, our protocol allows an effective communication
only when a small amount of noise affects the quantum
channel, thus restricting its application to relatively short
distances. Despite this restriction, there are non-trivial
situations where it can be used in a profitable way. One
of the possible applications concerns entity authentica-
tion [8], where one of the users (e.g., Bob) identifies the
other (Alice) by comparing the bits of a pre-distributed
and secret authentication key Kaut. Using the QDC pro-
tocol, the honest users have the chance to perform this
task without wasting too many quantum resources. For
instance, let us consider the case where Eve does not per-
turb the quantum channel but impersonates Alice. Such
a quantum impersonation attack [9] is promptly revealed
by a small QDC session, where Bob receives directly the
bits of Kaut and, therefore, performs an immediate com-
parison with his secret data. By contrast, in actual QKD
protocols, such an attack can be revealed only after the
generation of the encryption key Kenc (to be used in the
private comparison of Kaut). This clearly requires the
distribution and detection of many quantum states (ide-
ally infinite) and, therefore, the useless manipulation of
a huge amount of quantum resources (especially when
entity authentication is mutual). In general, since our
QDC scheme adopts the same quantum hardware as stan-
dard coherent state QKD, one can also consider random
switching between QDC (for authentication) and QKD
(for key generation).
As a final remark notice that our security analysis
concerns the case of individual attacks (where Eve does
not exploit any quantum memory). In future work it
would be interesting to investigate the performance of
the protocol in the presence of collective attacks, where
Eve exploits a quantum memory to store all her out-
put probes and performs an optimal coherent measure-
ment. It would be also interesting to extend the security
analysis to other forms of Gaussian interactions (i.e., not
6referable to a UGQCM) and even to non-Gaussian inter-
actions, that may play a role against the usage of repeti-
tion codes.
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